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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the effects of voter turnout on the vote shares received by the 
incumbent government. A system of simultaneous equations is estimated using a panel 
dataset of 278 Portuguese municipalities, for the period 1979-2005, covering 10 legislative 
elections. The results indicate that right-wing governments have lower vote shares when 
turnout is higher, while left-wing ones seem to be unaffected. There is also evidence of the 
responsibility hypothesis, that turnout is higher in closer elections, and that regional/local 
economic variables have non-linear effects on turnout. 
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1. Introduction 
This paper addresses the issue of whether turnout matters for the outcome of the 
political process, namely if it has some influence in determining the electoral results of 
incumbent governments. Implicitly, most studies assume that the preferences of nonvoters 
match those of actual voters and, therefore, turnout variations have no impact on electoral 
results. This hypothesis is debatable, as the reasons to cast a vote are not necessarily 
coincident with those that lead voters to choose a given party. On the one side we have an 
extensive literature that studies the voting choice between political alternatives. In the 
fields of economics and of political science this subject has been extensively researched, 
mainly through empirical analyses of governments’ vote/popularity (VP) functions. On the 
other side, the decision to vote or not has been a major topic of interest for those that study 
the democratic process, especially because turnout rates have been declining over time in 
most countries.  
The literature that combines both turnout and voting choices has mainly been 
concerned with non-voters’ partisan orientations, and, consequently, with the 
understanding of the potential impact of turnout fluctuations on party vote. Surprisingly, 
minimal attention has been devoted to the analysis of turnout effects on government vote 
shares. This raises some concerns, namely the possibility that empirical VP functions are 
consistently failing to capture the full scope of economic and political effects, and that they 
may be producing biased results. This is especially true if the economy affects both the 
decision of whether to vote and how to vote. Several studies show this to be the case,1 and 
so the most reasonable course of action is to regard turnout as an intervening variable in 
the VP function. If voters reward/punish governments, there is no reason to think that 
nonvoters, or at least some of them, do not use similar mechanisms to decide whether to 
vote or not. Consequently, their decisions will affect the electoral results of the incumbent 
party. Whether this effect actually exists and has enough influence to be a major 
determinant of the electoral failure/success of governments is, as yet, an unanswered 
question. Furthermore, the study of nonvoters’ partisan preferences probably should start 
                                                          
1
 On the effects of the economy on votes, see the surveys by Paldam (2004) and Nannestad and Paldam 
(1994). On turnout, see the surveys by Blais (2006) and Geys (2006). Regarding the Portuguese case, Veiga and 
Veiga (2010), among others, show that economic performance affects the votes received by the incumbent 
government, and Martins and Veiga (2013) show that turnout also reacts to the state of the economy. 
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within the VP function. If turnout does not influence the incumbents’ VP function or it 
affects all governments’ in a similar way regardless of their ideological orientation, then the 
most likely scenario is to reach similar conclusions when studying party functions, as VP 
functions are well-suited to capture some key dimensions that arise when trying to link 
turnout with party vote.  
Estimating a system of equations over an extensive panel dataset for the results at the 
municipal level of Portuguese legislative elections from 1979 to 2005, we find robust 
empirical evidence indicating that an increase in turnout reduces the vote shares of the 
incumbent national government when partisan effects are taken into account, there is 
evidence that right-wing incumbents are negatively affected by high turnout, while left-wing 
governments are not. Additionally, the economic dimension still remains an important 
factor in the VP function after controlling for turnout effects. Finally, the national and 
regional/local economies affect turnout. 
The rest of the article is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relationship 
between turnout and the vote. Section 3 describes the empirical model and dataset used. 
The panel data results are presented and discussed in section 4, and section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Turnout and Government electoral results 
Voter turnout is one of democracy’s outcomes that has been more carefully studied, 
and various theories have emerged addressing the many different aspects of the theme (see 
Geys 2006 and Blais 2006 for encompassing surveys). As it stands, the existing research has 
established some robust patterns. Sociological characteristics, especially age and education, 
have been consistently referenced as important explanatory factors (see, among others, 
Blais 2000 and Franklin 2004). We also know relatively well why turnout is higher in some 
countries than in others. Comparative studies highlight, as explanatory sources for these 
dissimilarities, the different institutional arrangements and electoral laws and in general, 
the more accountable and competitive the political systems are, the larger the electoral 
mobilization is (see Powell 1986, Jackman 1987, and Jackman and Miller 1995). However, 
concerning the economic dimension we find two compelling theories, one claiming that adverse 
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economic conditions foster turnout, while the other defends the opposite effect. On this subject 
the empirical literature provides mixed results and is far from reaching a consensus2.  
The determinants of governments’ electoral fortunes have been a major topic of 
interest especially for scholars that study the influence of economic conditions on the 
democratic process, and the most common approach to the subject has been the empirical 
analysis of governments’ vote/popularity (VP) functions. Traditional VP functions include 
two major groups of variables: economic and political. Overall, it seems uncontroversial that 
there are costs of ruling, meaning that governments’ lose popularity over time, although 
this does not mean they always lose elections. The literature also consistently finds that the 
economy matters, especially inflation and unemployment, and that voters react to the 
economic environment as predicted by the responsibility hypothesis (see Paldam 2004 and 
Nannestad and Paldam 1994). 
Traditionally, the subject of voter turnout and the study of governments’ electoral 
results have been empirically treated independently, even though they are determined by 
the same process, and in the theoretical voting models based on the works of Downs (1957) 
and Riker and Ordeshook (1968) we find both decisions depicted in one single equation. 
Traditional government vote functions implicitly assume that one of the key questions 
on the elector’s mind is whether to vote or not for the government. With this binary choice 
the stand-alone equation of government voting is appropriate, as it is reasonable to assume 
that the most logical choice when voting against the government is to support the party that 
is best prepared to overthrow it. However, abstention is also an option, and the literature 
has chosen to ignore this third choice, maybe because of methodological difficulties 
associated with the inclusion of the nonvoters’ share. Nevertheless, there is little doubt that 
a system that includes all three choices is closer to reality than the customary approach. 
Lavernier (1992) tests the influence of economic conditions on voter participation rates and 
on electoral outcomes in gubernatorial elections, modeling voting as a two-stage process 
where an individual first decides whether or not to vote and only afterwards determines 
which candidate to support. He concludes that the outcomes of gubernatorial elections are 
mainly determined by non-economic factors and only finds weak evidence supporting the 
relevance of economic variables. Likewise, Lacy and Burden (1999) include abstention as a 
                                                          
2
 See Martins and Veiga (2013) for a more detailed discussion. 
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choice in voting models, highlighting the impact of Perot’s candidacy on turnout and on the 
other presidential contestants’ electoral results. Bengtsson (2004) argues that turnout 
variations can actually affect the importance of economic variables in the VP function and 
his results show that in elections with decreasing turnout rates the economy vanishes from 
the governments’ vote function, resurfacing again in elections with stable or increasing 
turnout. 
In the literature that links the two electoral decisions, clearly the topic that has been 
more closely scrutinized is the partisan consequences of low turnout. DeNardo (1980) 
identifies an important effect that can explain the impact (if any) of turnout on party vote: 
increased turnout helps the party with the larger reserve of habitual nonvoters. Popular 
wisdom considers that left-wing parties’ supporters dominate in this category as these 
consistent abstainers tend to be, broadly speaking, lower status citizens that are more likely 
to prefer parties on the left (Lijphart 1997). There is some cross-national empirical support 
for this idea. For instance, Pacek and Radcliff (1995) find that across 19 democracies, a one 
percent increase in turnout increases on average the vote share of left parties by nearly 
one-third of a percentage point, while Bohrer et al. (2000), working on a panel of post-
communist countries, estimate nearly a one percent effect of turnout on these parties’ 
electoral outcomes. Nevertheless the majority of the literature has been unable to find solid 
evidence of this relationship, and Lutz and Marsh (2007) conclude that turnout probably 
does not matter a great deal3. 
It is reasonable to assume that occasional voters tend to be unreliable partisans (or they 
simply do not identify themselves with any of the existing parties) and thus are more easily 
motivated by short term considerations. If so, habitual nonvoters, or at least some of them, 
probably rely on a non-partisan view of electoral alternatives. Consequently, the electoral 
choice may be between voting for or against the government. Grofman et al. (1999) point 
out the existence of a competition effect, claiming that high turnout is more likely to occur 
when the contest is close. A decrease in the government’s popularity raises the number of 
voters wanting to dislodge it from power; therefore, those that decide to leave the 
nonvoters’ ranks tend to vote against the government. If voters’ tendencies to punish 
governments exceed the motivation to reward them (“negative voting” theory, see Lau 
                                                          
3
 See also Zimmer (1985) and Tucker and Vedlitz (1986). 
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1982) then one should expect the effect to be greater in situations of severe economic 
hardships.  Short term political and economic conditions can play a major role in shifting 
partisan preferences of nonvoters. Therefore, one obvious conclusion is that the 
reward/punishment mechanism and other factors identified in governments’ voting 
functions, such as the costs of ruling, may have indirect effects on the VP function that 
comes from turnout variations.  
There is no reason to think that the partisan bias effect, and the competition effect 
cannot occur simultaneously and the way these forces combine is important to understand 
the role of turnout on governments’ vote functions. Clearly, these effects work against each 
other when left-wing parties are incumbents, and exhibit the same direction when right-
wing parties are in office, therefore only a leftist party in the opposition should experience a 
positive effect from both sources This means that a minimum requirement for nonvoters to 
actually be more prone to vote for left-wing parties is that the governments’ VP function 
shows systematical differences in the impact of turnout that work in favor of left-wing 
governments when compared to other incumbents. Table 1 summarizes the different 
possible scenarios that can be found in the VP function for which the traditional partisan 
bias claim can hold, when considering multiparty systems.  
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
In sum, right-wing incumbents’ electoral results must not be positively impacted by 
higher turnout and the effect on the left-wing governments’ vote shares determines our 
perception of the hypothetical existence and magnitude of both the responsibility 
hypothesis and the partisan bias effect. The last scenario in Table 1, where no effect is found 
for the right and a positive one is found for the left, is a rather strange possibility, with no 
evidence of the competition effect and with what we call a partisan bias with asymmetric 
response effect. In this case, nonvoters are leftist but do not seem to care about right-wing 
governments, they only reward or punish left governments. As for the other possible 
scenarios missing in Table 1 (when the right has a positive competition effect), they either 
refute the existence of both effects or negate the competition effect and posit that frequent 
abstainers are more sympathetic towards the right-wing parties. 
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3. The data 
In order to investigate the relationship between turnout and the incumbent 
government’s vote shares we estimate a system of simultaneous equations over an 
extensive dataset comprised of panel data for all mainland Portuguese municipalities4 
(currently 278), ranging from 1979 to 2005 and covering 10 legislative elections. Electoral 
results and political data used were all obtained from the National Elections Commission 
(Comissão Nacional de Eleições - CNE). Demographic data were obtained from the local 
authority’s (Direcção Geral das Autarquias Locais - DGAL) annual publication called Finanças 
Municipais (Municipal Finances) and from the Portuguese National Institute of Statistics 
(Instituto Nacional de Estatísticas - INE).5  
An ample set of economic variables was assembled in order to capture both national 
and the local economic conditions. The national unemployment rate was obtained from the 
OECD’s Main Economic Indicators, while the inflation rate and the national GDP were 
acquired from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics. Data for regional GDP and 
unemployment rates (both at the NUTS III6 level) were obtained from INE. The regional 
NUTS III unemployment rate was available only for 1991 and from 1999 onwards, thus 
reducing time variability and the number of observations in our sample. To circumvent this 
scenario, we estimated a proxy for the unemployment rate for the remaining years of the 
1990’s using the multiple imputation algorithm developed by Honaker and King (2010)7. 
Unfortunately, there are no consistent time series data for unemployment available at the 
municipal level. However, in order to have some labor market data at the municipal level, 
we use employment in private firms seeded in each municipality, which is available on the 
                                                          
4
 Mainland Portugal is divided into 18 districts and each district contains several municipalities. Overall there 
are 278 municipalities (municípios or concelhos). 
5
 The data on the percentage of the population in the tertiary sector were obtained from the Census operation 
of INE. Data were available for 1981, 1991 and 2001. As the evolution of this type of variable is generally based 
on a stable trend, a constant growth rate was assumed to fill in the missing data. Data on population by age 
(also from INE) was obtained by assuming a constant growth rate for the period 1979-1989, on the basis of the 
1970 and 1981 census; for the remaining years annual data was acquired from INE’s resident population 
estimates. 
6
 NUTS is a geocode standard for referencing the subdivisions of countries for statistical purposes, used within 
the European Union. In Portugal, a hierarchy of three NUTS levels is established. Continental Portugal 
corresponds to a NUTS I region, which is subdivided into 5 NUTS II regions. These 5 regions are then subdivided 
into 28 sub regions (NUTS III) each one comprised of several municipalities.  
7
 This method is a bootstrapping-based algorithm particularly suited to tackle the problem of missing data in 
panel data when t<n. It extracts relevant information from the observed portions of a data set via a statistical 
model that includes a set of explanatory variables. This method was not used to solve the missing data 
problem with our demographic variables because there were too many missing values. 
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“Quadros de Pessoal” database of the Portuguese Ministry of Solidarity and Social Security 
(MSSS).8 Also from this source, we use data on the average municipal real wage growth rate, 
available since 1985. As proxies of municipal income and purchasing power we use three 
indexes from the Marktest’s Sales Index database: the Income index, the Fiscal burden 
index, and the Sales index.9 Descriptive statistics for all variables used in the estimations are 
shown in Table 2. 
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
4. Empirical model 
The hypotheses that turnout (Turn) affects votes for the incumbent government (GV) 
and that economic variables (Eco) affect both votes and turnout recommend the joint 
estimation of equations for vote shares and turnout. The structural form of the model can 
be written as follows: 
GV = g(Turn, Eco, X) (1) 
Turn = h(Eco, Y) (2) 
where g and h are functions and X and Y are (possibly overlapping) vectors of other 
determinants of government vote shares and turnout at legislative elections. The scenarios 
for the effects of turnout on vote shares were described in Table 1. In the simplest 
specification, in which turnout is included in equation (1) without any interaction with 
partisan dummy variables, we expect a negative coefficient.  
Based on the literature surveyed in the previous section, some exclusion restrictions 
are imposed on g and h, so that we can empirically identify how vote shares and turnout are 
related. As economic variables affect vote shares and turnout, the vector Eco is included in 
both equations (although it does not have to be the same in both equations). The 
responsibility hypothesis suggests that favorable/adverse economic circumstances have 
positive/negative effects in the vote shares of the incumbent government. Then, according 
to Martins and Veiga (2013), favorable/adverse national economic circumstances 
                                                          
8
 This is a yearly mandatory employment survey that covers almost all privately owned firms employing paid 
labor in Portugal (public servants and own employment are not included).  
9
 The Income index reflects municipalities’ incomes by accounting for the fiscal burden, electricity 
consumption, automobiles sales, and the number of banks and retail stores. The fiscal burden index combines 
national and municipal taxes paid in each municipality. Finally, the Sales Index reflects municipalities’ 
purchasing power by considering a population index and the Income Index. 
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decrease/increase turnout and regional/local economic variables have a quadratic effect on 
turnout. Regarding non-economic variables, we also include in both equations lags of the 
dependent variable, the population density as a measure of the municipalities’ size, and a 
dummy variable (Same party as national) which takes the value of 1 when a local 
government is controlled by the party that holds power at the national level, and equals 
zero otherwise. Regarding the effects of the population density, we have no prior 
expectations concerning the coefficient in the vote shares equation, but we expect a 
negative effect in the turnout equation, as more populous and more densely populated 
areas usually register lower turnout rates. The dummy variable referred to above identifies 
those municipalities where the national governing party exhibits high vote shares at 
municipal elections. One should expect this strong political support to be reproduced in 
legislative elections, which implies a positive coefficient. Finally, time and electoral district 
specific effects are also expected to affect vote shares and turnout, and are thus also 
included in both equations. 
The literature on voter turnout (see Blais 2006 and Geys 2006 for surveys) suggests 
that some additional variables should be included in equation (2). Regarding political 
variables, we use a standard measure of closeness of the elections, defined as the difference 
in vote shares between the winning party and its closest challenger at the district level 
(WinMargD),10 and also the Laakso and Taegepera (1979) index for the effective number of 
political parties, also district based. We expect a negative coefficient for the win margin, as 
greater values are associated with less competitive elections, which tend to be associated 
with lower turnout rates. Since both the theoretical and empirical literatures are 
inconclusive regarding the effects of party fragmentation on turnout (see Geys 2006), we 
have no prior concerning the sign of the coefficient associated with the effective number of 
parties. To control for the municipalities’ socio-demographic characteristics, we include the 
the share of the resident population over 65 years old and the percentage of the 
                                                          
10
 Although the closeness of the election at the national level may affect turnout, the inclusion of an additional 
variable with no cross-sectional variation (like the national macroeconomic variables) may be problematic. 
Thus, we chose to include the winning margin at the district level. Since this is the level at which votes are 
transformed into seats in the Portuguese parliament, voters may actually realize that, independent of the 
national result, their votes are more likely to matter when there is a close election in their district. As a 
robustness test, we replaced the winning margin at the district level by the national winning margin. The 
results obtained regarding the effects of turnout on votes were practically the same, and the national winning 
margin had a negative coefficient in most of the estimations of the turnout equation. These results are not 
shown here, but are available from the authors upon request. 
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municipality’s population employed in the tertiary (services) sector. As these variables are 
not expected to directly affect the vote shares of the incumbent government, they are not 
included in vector X of equation (1). 
Given that the margin of victory at the district level (WinMargD), included in the 
turnout equation, is endogenous to the government’s vote shares, we estimate a third 
equation, in which this variable is explained by the government vote share (GV), the margin 
of victory at the district level in the previous legislative elections, the margin of victory at 
the municipal level (WinMargM) in the previous elections and time and district effects. 
The above discussion on exclusion restrictions implies the estimation of the following 
system of equations: 
GVi,E = α1Turni,E + α2GVi,E-1 + α3Ecoi,E + α4Xi,E + α5Electioni,E + di,E + εi,E (3) 
Turni,E = 1Turni,E-1 + 2Ecoi,E + 3Yi,E + 4Electioni,E + 5WinMargDi,E-1 + di,E + μi,E (4) 
WinMargDi,E = λ1GVi,E+ λ2WinMargDi,E-1 + λ3WinMargMi,E-1+ λ4Electioni,E + di,E + ξi,E  (5) 
i=1,…,278 ,   E=1979, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1987, 1991, 1995, 1999, 2002, 2005 
where GVi,E is the percentage of votes obtained in municipality i by the national government 
party in legislative election E, Turni,E is the percentage of registered voters in municipality i 
which voted in legislative election E, WinMargDi,E is the margin of victory in the district level 
municipality i belongs to in election E, Ecoi,E is a set of economic variables, Xi,E and Yi,E are 
sets of non-economic variables, Electioni,E is a discrete variable that indexes the elections 
from 1 to 10, di,E is a set of district dummies (the municipalities are grouped into 18 
districts), α1-α5, 1-4 and λ1-λ5 are parameters or vectors of parameters to be estimated, 
and εi,E and μi,E are error terms. Since national economic variables do not have cross-
sectional variation, it is not possible to combine them with time dummy variables. Thus, 
time effects are accounted for with an election trend (Electioni,E) which varies from 1 in the 
first election to 10 in the last (works like a time or election trend). Finally, since votes are 
transformed into seats at the district level,11 we control for district specific effects by 
including district dummy variables (di,E). 
The equations should not be estimated by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), as their 
disturbances are correlated with the endogenous variables. Furthermore, as some of the 
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 In legislative elections, the territory of mainland Portugal is divided into 18 constituencies (one for each 
district), where political parties present ordered and closed lists of candidates. The number of deputies elected 
in each district is a function of its population. Votes are transformed into mandates using the D’Hondt method, 
which is a highest averages method for allocating seats in party-list proportional representation. 
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explanatory variables in one equation are dependent variables of other equations, the error 
terms of the equations are expected to be correlated. Given these problems, the equations 
are estimated simultaneously by Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS), which uses an 
instrumental variables approach to produce consistent estimates and Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) to deal with the correlation of the disturbances across equations.12 In order to 
account for wide population differences across municipalities the respective numbers of 
registered voters are used as weights. 
 
5. Empirical results 
The results of the estimation of the system of equations when including economic 
variables only at the national level are shown in Table 3.13 In order to avoid simultaneity 
problems, especially when elections took place in the beginning of the year, the values of 
the economic variables considered in the estimations are those of the year before the 
elections. The results for vote shares indicate that, according to our expectations, higher 
turnout decreases the vote shares of incumbent governments.  
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Consistent with the responsibility hypothesis, higher inflation and unemployment 
reduce vote shares, while higher real GDP growth rates increase them. Thus, as in Veiga 
and Veiga (2010), there is evidence that Portuguese voters reward/punish governments for 
positive/negative economic outcomes. Concerning the remaining explanatory variables, 
lagged vote shares, population density and the election trend are negatively associated 
with current vote shares, while party similarity between the national and local 
governments is associated with higher vote shares. 
Regarding the turnout equation, and in line with Martins and Veiga (2013), 
positive/negative economic outcomes are associated with lower/higher turnout, indicating 
that voters are more mobilized to vote (eventually, to penalize the incumbent government) 
in times of economic hardship. There is also evidence of persistence of turnout rates, that 
party similarity, higher percentage of the population in the tertiary sector and the election 
                                                          
12
 The system of equations is estimated using command reg3 of Stata version 12. For further information on 
the 3SLS method, see Zellner and Theil (1962) and Greene (2012, Chapter 10). 
13
 Data on regional/local economic variables starts in the mid-1980s, for some variables, and in the early 
1990s, for others. Thus, in order to perform estimations for the full sample period of 1979-2005, we include 
only national economic variables in the estimations of Tables 3 and 4. 
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trend are positively associated with turnout, and that population density, higher winning 
margin (smaller closeness of elections), and greater effective number of parties lead to 
lower turnout. These results are consistent with our expectations and with the results of 
previous studies. Finally, concerning the win-margin equation,14 higher government vote 
shares lead to greater winning margins, as one would expect, and greater win-margins at 
the district or municipal levels in the previous elections are associated with lower current 
winning margins. 
In order to more completely analyze the effects of turnout on vote shares, in the 
estimations whose results are reported in Table 4, we interacted turnout with a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 for governments led by the Socialist Party (PS) and equals 
zero for governments led by the Social Democratic Party (PSD). Elected governments in 
Portugal since the Revolution of April 1974, which restored Democracy after 48 years of 
dictatorship, have been led by the Socialist Party (Partido Socialista - PS) or by the Social 
Democratic Party (Partido Social Democrata – PSD). Ideologically, PS can be classified as 
center-left and PSD as center-right. The average marginal effects of turnout on vote shares, 
depending on which party leads the national government, are reported in the Appendix.  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
For both estimations, the effects for PS governments are not statistically significant, 
indicating that left-wing governments do not tend to be affected by the turnout rate. The 
effects for right-wing governments are negative, highly statistically significant, and sizeable. 
The estimated marginal effects imply that a 1 percentage point increase in the turnout rate 
decreases the vote shares of right-wing (PSD) governments by 0.665 to 1.062 percentage 
points. Given the absence of turnout effects for left-wing governments and the negative 
effects for right-wing ones, we conclude that, of the scenarios described in Table 1, the one 
that best reflects the Portuguese experience is the second. Thus, there is some evidence of 
both the competition effect and of partisan bias.15 
The estimated effect of PS governments on vote shares is calculated combining the 
estimated coefficients for the PS dummy with those for of its interaction with turnout 
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 Since our investigation primarily concerns vote shares and turnout, and there are no especially interesting 
hypotheses related to the estimation of the equation for the win margin (Equation 5), we chose not report its 
results in the following tables. Nevertheless, they are available from the authors upon request. 
15
 These results are also in line with the turnout model of Hortala-Vallve and Esteve-Volart (2011), which 
implies that moderate voters (most of the PS electorate) tend to vote less than voters who report to be either 
liberal or conservative (who tend to vote more for PSD). 
13 
 
Overall, there is weak evidence of a positive effect,16 implying that PS governments tend to 
have larger vote shares than PSD governments. The results for the other explanatory 
variables are very similar to those reported in Table 2, implying that our previous 
conclusions remain valid. 
Regional/municipal economic variables were included in the estimations whose 
results are shown in Table 5. Since a sufficiently long time series of municipal 
unemployment rates is not available, we use unemployment rates for the 28 NUTS III 
regions of mainland Portugal. The same was done for real GDP, as it is not available at the 
municipal level.  
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
The results of estimations 1 and 2 indicate that higher regional unemployment 
reduces vote shares, while higher regional real GDP increases them. As with national 
economic variables, the effects on turnout have the opposite sign. Then, we included 
several municipal variables, such as the income and fiscal burden indexes, which are 
proxies for municipal income, but these were generally not statistically significant. The 
national economic variables remain statistically significant in all equations and have the 
expected signs.17 
Martins and Veiga (2013) show that regional/municipal economic variables have a 
quadratic effect on turnout at Portuguese elections. Their result is consistent with 
expressive voting (see Hillman 2010), in the sense that voters may feel more compelled to 
express their satisfaction/dissatisfaction at the ballot box when the economy is unusually 
good/bad than when economic performance is as usual. In order to take this evidence of 
non-linear effects into account, we introduced a quadratic term for the regional/municipal 
economic variables in the estimations of Table 6.  
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
The results of estimation 1 clearly indicate that regional unemployment has a U-
shaped relationship with turnout. This implies that voters are more mobilized when the 
economy is behaving very well or very bad, but they demobilize at intermediate rates of 
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 The estimated marginal effects of PS Government on the government vote shares (GV) are: 
- Estimation 1: 1.949*** (p-value = 0.003). 
- Estimation 2: 5.320*** (p-value = 0.000). 
17
 The estimations include all the control variables of Tables 3 and 4. The results for those variables were not 
included in order to keep the Table within a reasonable size, but they are available upon request. The same 
procedure was adopted in the following tables. 
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unemployment (the turning point is at 6%). The other variables, which proxy municipal 
income, have the expected inverted U-shaped relationship with turnout, as greater values 
imply better economic outcomes.18  
In the estimations of Table 7, we add the interaction of turnout in the vote equation 
with the dummy variable for left-wing (PS) governments. Again, only right-wing 
governments (PSD) lose vote shares when turnout is higher, while left-wing ones are not 
affected by turnout rates, providing further support for scenario 2 of Table 1 (the average 
marginal effects of turnout on the government vote shares are reported in the Appendix). 
The evidence regarding the quadratic effects of regional/municipal economic variables on 
turnout remains. Although most of these variables do not seem to affect vote shares 
directly (with the exception of the NUTS III unemployment rate), they affect it indirectly, 
through turnout. 
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
 
6. Conclusion 
Using an extensive panel dataset covering all (278) Portuguese mainland municipalities, 
over the period 1979-2005, which covers 10 elections, we investigated whether voter 
turnout affects the vote shares of incumbent governments. More concretely, we performed 
Three-Stage Least Squares (3SLS) estimations of a system of three simultaneous equations, 
whose dependent variables were, respectively, the vote share received by the incumbent 
government (by the party of the prime minister), the turnout rate, and the win margin 
(closeness of the elections). 
Regarding the turnout effects, the empirical results show that, on average, higher 
turnout leads to lower vote shares for the incumbent government. When partisan 
considerations are taken into account, there is evidence that right-wing incumbents lose 
support when turnout is higher, while the vote shares of left-wing governments do not 
seem to be affected by turnout. Thus, there is some evidence of the competition effect of 
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 An exception to these quadratic effects of regional variables is real GDP per capita at the NUTS III level, 
which does not seem to affect turnout. The lack of results may eventually be due to the fact that many values 
of this series were generated by an interpolation algorithm, as actual values were not available for several 
years in our sample. 
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turnout and of partisan bias. In this last case, then nonvoters may be less ideologically 
driven and more concerned with the position of each party with respect to power. 
There is also empirical support for the responsibility hypothesis, as vote shares tend to 
increase with faster GDP growth and decrease with higher rates of inflation and 
unemployment. As in Veiga and Veiga (2010), the evidence of the effects of economic 
variables on votes is stronger for national variables than for local ones. This is not strange, 
as in legislative elections voters are evaluating the national government, which should be 
held more responsible for the national economy than for the local one. 
Finally, there is clear evidence that turnout is affected by economic variables. In line 
with Martins and Veiga (2013), national macroeconomic variables have a linear effect on 
turnout, which increases when economic performance worsens, and regional/municipal 
economic variables have non-linear effects. Moreover, turnout is higher in extreme 
situations, in which economic performance is really good or bad, and lower for intermediate 
values of regional/municipal economic variables. 
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Table 1. Scenarios and conclusions for the effect of turnout variations 
 
 Effect of turnout variations 
on government VP function 
Theoretical conclusion 
 
(1) 
 RIGHT: negative effect 
 LEFT: negative effect 
 The right is more penalized than 
the left. 
Strong dominance of the competition effect.  
Weak evidence of partisan bias. 
(2)  RIGHT: negative effect 
 LEFT: no effect 
Some evidence of the competition effect.  
Some evidence of partisan bias. 
(3)  RIGHT: negative effect 
 LEFT: positive effect 
Strong evidence of partisan bias. 
Weak dominance of the competition effect.  
(4)  RIGHT: no effect 
 LEFT: positive effect 
No evidence of the competition effect.  
Partisan bias with asymmetric response. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
Variable # Obs. Mean Std.Dev. Min. Max. 
Effective number of parties (district) 2477 3.19 0.65 2.04 5.08 
Election 2477 7.01 2.58 3.00 11.00 
Fiscal burden index (ybe) 1103 3.63 14.14 0.04 252.27 
Government share of votes 2477 38.75 16.03 5.45 85.45 
Growth rate of wages (ybe) 1653 3.03 5.18 -24.80 59.54 
Income index (ybe) 1103 3.63 11.71 0.19 193.29 
PS Government 2477 0.33 0.47 0.00 1.00 
National inflation rate (ybe) 2477 12.79 9.49 2.36 28.88 
National real GDP growth rate (ybe) 2477 2.59 2.18 -1.88 5.64 
National unemployment rate (ybe) 2477 6.63 1.59 4.07 8.86 
NUTS III real GDP growth rate (ybe) 1103 3.28 3.27 -5.46 25.35 
NUTS III unemployment rate (ybe) 1103 5.80 2.41 1.67 13.54 
Population density 2477 2.83 8.76 0.06 96.36 
% Population in tertiary sector 2474 43.39 15.27 10.07 85.57 
% Population over 65 years old 2477 17.80 6.00 5.33 42.02 
Sales index (ybe) 1103 3.63 10.40 0.19 168.79 
Same party as national 2477 0.41 0.49 0.00 1.00 
Turnout 2477 69.28 8.88 48.07 92.67 
Winning margin (district) 2477 16.42 11.60 0.05 45.82 
Winning margin (municipality) 2477 20.12 15.04 0.01 77.20 
Sources: CNE, DGAL, IMF, INE, OECD, Marktest, MSSS. 
Note: “ybe” stands for year before election. 
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Table 3: Votes, turnout and the national economy 
 (1)   (2)  
 Vote share Turnout Win Margin  Vote share Turnout Win Margin 
Turnout -0.429***    -0.729***   
(-7.907)    (-14.35)   
National unemploy-
ment rate (ybe) 
-1.689*** 1.548***      
(-10.10) (13.66)      
National inflation  
rate (ybe) 
-1.350*** 0.578***   -0.286*** 0.0497*  
(-29.64) (14.19)   (-4.508) (1.674)  
National real GDP 
growth rate (ybe) 
    2.941*** -0.836***  
    (23.22) (-17.04)  
Government share 
of votes (-1) 
-0.145***    -0.0280**   
(-8.994)    (-2.006)   
Government share 
of votes (-2) 
-0.321***    -0.272***   
(-21.29)    (-19.41)   
Turnout (-1)  0.830***    0.952***  
 (58.86)    (51.71)  
Population density -0.0328*** -0.0102***   -0.0307*** -0.0113***  
(-3.577) (-3.160)   (-3.586) (-2.672)  
Same party as 
national 
5.399*** 0.209**   4.519*** 0.0147  
(13.95) (2.063)   (12.47) (0.111)  
% Population over 
65 years old 
 -0.00917    0.0237  
 (-0.586)    (1.142)  
% Population in 
tertiary sector 
 0.0186***    0.0224***  
 (3.617)    (3.298)  
Winning margin 
(district) 
 -0.0785***    0.366***  
 (-2.629)    (17.41)  
Effective number of 
parties (district) 
 -5.745***    -0.346  
 (-9.640)    (-0.979)  
Winning margin 
(district) (-1) 
  -0.124***    -0.101*** 
  (-5.616)    (-4.970) 
Winning margin 
(municipal) (-1) 
  -0.175***    -0.193*** 
  (-9.497)    (-11.75) 
Government share 
of votes 
  0.511***    0.442*** 
  (25.03)    (23.21) 
Election (time) -5.774*** 2.137*** -0.736***  -2.396*** 0.677*** -0.735*** 
(-28.28) (16.82) (-10.10)  (-9.645) (6.456) (-10.21) 
# Observations 2,474 2,474 2,474  2,474 2,474 2,474 
Adjusted R-squared 0.576 0.932 0.210  0.635 0.791 0.232 
NOTES: Three-stage least squares (3SLS) results using robust standard errors weighted by the 
number of registered voters in each municipality. The results for the winning margin equation are 
not shown here but are available upon request. All estimations include a constant and a complete 
set of district dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. “ybe” 
stands for year before election. 
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Table 4: Effects of turnout depending on the government party 
 (1)  (2) 
 Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout 
Turnout -0.666***   -1.062***  
(-10.40)   (-18.29)  
PS Government -41.15***   -75.16***  
(-8.445)   (-17.47)  
Turnout * PS 
Government 
0.611***   1.141***  
(8.558)   (17.65)  
National unemployment 
rate (ybe) 
-2.423*** 1.604***    
(-11.05) (15.82)    
National inflation  
rate (ybe) 
-1.641*** 0.573***  -0.579*** -0.0285 
(-24.85) (15.60)  (-8.108) (-0.973) 
National real GDP 
growth rate (ybe) 
   3.992*** -0.817*** 
   (28.83) (-15.91) 
Government share of 
votes (-1) 
-0.169***   0.0223  
(-8.582)   (1.543)  
Government share of 
votes (-2) 
-0.321***   -0.284***  
(-18.74)   (-19.91)  
Turnout (-1)  0.820***   0.963*** 
 (58.95)   (50.35) 
Population density -0.0340*** -0.0102***  -0.0300*** -0.0137*** 
(-3.752) (-3.202)  (-3.656) (-3.103) 
Same party as national 5.774*** 0.358***  4.687*** -0.127 
(14.99) (3.611)  (13.50) (-0.934) 
% Population over 65 
years old 
 -0.0163   0.0349 
 (-1.052)   (1.624) 
% Population in tertiary 
sector 
 0.0186***   0.0281*** 
 (3.643)   (3.996) 
Winning margin 
(district) 
 -0.151***   0.484*** 
 (-5.749)   (26.14) 
Effective number of 
parties (district) 
 -6.209***   0.970*** 
 (-11.74)   (2.940) 
Election (time) -7.166*** 2.047***  -3.467*** 0.567*** 
(-28.62) (17.47)  (-13.83) (5.258) 
# Observations 
Adjusted R-squared 
2,474 2,474  2,474 2,474 
0.589 0.932  0.666 0.707 
NOTES: Three-stage least squares (3SLS) results using robust standard errors weighted by the 
number of registered voters in each municipality. The results for the winning margin equation are 
not shown here but are available upon request. All estimations include a constant and a complete 
set of district dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. “ybe” 
stands for year before election. 
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Table 5: Votes, turnout and the regional/local economy 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout 
Turnout -0.243***   -0.318***   -0.309***   -0.306***  
(-3.208)   (-4.856)   (-4.673)   (-4.622)  
National unemployment 
rate (ybe) 
-2.379*** 1.764***          
(-7.348) (18.22)          
National real GDP growth 
rate (ybe) 
   3.929*** -1.373***  4.060*** -1.368***  4.072*** -1.369*** 
   (19.85) (-39.22)  (20.97) (-42.66)  (20.99) (-42.67) 
NUTS III unemployment 
rate (ybe) 
-0.843*** 0.115*          
(-4.348) (1.839)          
NUTS III real GDP growth 
rate (ybe) 
   0.213** 0.00786       
   (2.393) (0.387)       
Income index (ybe)       0.0116 0.000489    
      (1.496) (0.261)    
Fiscal burden index (ybe)          0.0119* -0.00146 
         (1.854) (-0.943) 
# Observations 1,100 1,100  1,100 1,100  1,100 1,100  1,100 1,100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.460 0.760  0.589 0.886  0.586 0.886  0.587 0.886 
NOTES: Three-stage least squares (3SLS) results using robust standard errors weighted by the number of registered voters in each municipality. The results 
for the winning margin equation are not shown here but are available upon request. All estimations include the control variables shown in Tables 3 and 4, a 
constant and a complete set of district dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. “ybe” stands for year before 
election. 
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Table 6: Votes, turnout and quadratic effects of the regional/local economy on turnout 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout 
Turnout -0.353***   -0.315***   -0.317***   -0.311***  
(-4.663)   (-4.772)   (-4.814)   (-4.708)  
National unemployment 
rate (ybe) 
-2.225*** 1.839***          
(-6.859) (19.26)          
National real GDP growth 
rate (ybe) 
   4.048*** -1.373***  4.044*** -1.372***  4.063*** -1.381*** 
   (20.91) (-42.90)  (20.89) (-42.90)  (20.94) (-43.14) 
NUTS III unemployment 
rate (ybe) 
-0.855*** -1.102***          
(-4.390) (-5.963)          
NUTS III unemployment 
rate (ybe) squared 
 0.0904***          
 (6.955)          
Income index (ybe)    0.0115 0.0256***       
   (1.488) (3.096)       
Income index (ybe) 
squared 
    -0.000124***       
    (-3.115)       
Sales index (ybe)       0.0124 0.0281***    
      (1.364) (3.163)    
Sales index (ybe) squared        -0.000156***    
       (-3.194)    
Fiscal burden index (ybe)          0.0119* 0.0242*** 
         (1.847) (4.068) 
Fiscal burden index 
squared (ybe) 
          -0.0001*** 
          (-4.460) 
# Observations 1,100 1,100  1,100 1,100  1,100 1,100  1,100 1,100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.476 0.768  0.587 0.886  0.587 0.886  0.587 0.887 
NOTES: Three-stage least squares (3SLS) results using robust standard errors weighted by the number of registered voters in each municipality. The results 
for the winning margin equation are not shown here but are available upon request. All estimations include the control variables shown in Tables 3 and 4, a 
constant and a complete set of district dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. “ybe” stands for year before 
election.  
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Table 7: Votes, turnout and quadratic effects of the regional/local economy on turnout 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
 Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout  Vote share Turnout 
Turnout -0.511***   -0.701***   -0.703***   -0.699***  
(-6.280)   (-8.505)   (-8.539)   (-8.472)  
PS Government 2.785   -45.07***   -45.10***   -45.21***  
(0.442)   (-7.683)   (-7.684)   (-7.705)  
Turnout * PS Government 0.467***   0.681***   0.681***   0.682***  
(5.208)   (7.526)   (7.528)   (7.545)  
National unemployment 
rate (ybe) 
12.26*** 1.867***          
(12.65) (19.64)          
National real GDP growth 
rate (ybe) 
   4.368*** -1.384***  4.363*** -1.384***  4.386*** -1.392*** 
   (13.69) (-43.73)  (13.68) (-43.73)  (13.73) (-44.00) 
NUTS III unemployment  
rate (ybe) 
-0.986*** -1.471***          
(-5.713) (-7.721)          
NUTS III unemployment  
rate (ybe) squared 
 0.117***          
 (8.709)          
Income index (ybe)    0.00849 0.0263***       
   (1.124) (3.167)       
Income index (ybe) squared     -0.0001***       
    (-3.177)       
Sales index (ybe)       0.00885 0.0289***    
      (1.000) (3.221)    
Sales index (ybe) squared        -0.00016***    
       (-3.243)    
Fiscal burden index (ybe)          0.00871 0.0250*** 
         (1.389) (4.173) 
Fiscal burden index (ybe)           -0.0001*** 
          (-4.557) 
# Observations 1,100 1,100  1,100 1,100  1,100 1,100  1,100 1,100 
Adjusted R-squared 0.606 0.782  0.606 0.891  0.606 0.891  0.607 0.891 
NOTES: Three-stage least squares (3SLS) results using robust standard errors weighted by the number of registered voters in each municipality. The results for the winning 
margin equation are not shown here but are available upon request. All estimations include the control variables shown in Tables 3 and 4, a constant and a complete set of 
district dummies. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. “ybe” stands for year before election. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Table A.1: Estimated Marginal Effects of Turnout on Vote Shares 
Table Estimation 
Right-wing (PS) Government 
(PS Government=0) 
Left-wing Government 
(PS Government=1) 
4 
1 -0.665*** -0.054 
2 -1.062*** 0.079 
7 
1 -0.511*** -0.043 
2 -0.693*** -0.024 
3 -0.701*** -0.020 
4 -0.703*** -0.022 
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